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In The United States Bankruptcy Court
For The District Of Colorado

Case No. 05-40334-EEB
Chapter 7
Adv Pro. 06-1225-EEB

In re: Robbins, Barbara


Karen Dudnikov,
Michael Meadors



Barbara Robbins



        Plaintiffs Karen Dudnikov and Michael Meadors, pro se, (“Plaintiffs”) submit the following Reply To Debtor's Cross-Claims (“Reply”) in response to Debtor's cross-claims in her Response To Complaint Filed By Meadors/Dudnikov (sic). Attachments are numbered beginning at #19. Because of the rambling and unstructured manner of her response, Plaintiffs are unsure of the nature of cross-claims so the Plaintiffs are addressing all issued raised by the Debtor.


        1. On October 7, 2005, Barbara Robbins, (“Debtor”), filed a voluntary petition for bankruptcy (“Petition”). It was assigned case number 05-40334-EEB.

        2. On February 2, 2006, Karen Dudnikov and Michael Meadors (“Plaintiffs”) filed an adversarial proceeding (“Complaint”) with a Memorandum In Support (“Memorandum”). It was assigned case number 06-1225-EEB.

        3. On March 2, 2006, Debtor filed her Response to Complaint (“Response #1”) and her Response to Memorandum (“Response #2”).


        4. Debtor rambles on about many topics but few in regard to her voluntary petition. Plaintiffs would ask to Court to caution the Debtor about making unsubstantiated and potentially defamatory statements about the Plaintiffs.


        5. Debtor misstates numerous facts in her rambling and self-serving discourse about the history behind the Plaintiffs and the Debtor. She ends her “narrative” with:

    “I pray this Honorable Court can set-aside the judgment in the case described herein, and move the venue to this Court to rehear it.”

The Plaintiffs have filed a Motion To Strike with this Court concerning her improper motion for a hearing on the state issue.

        6. Debtor improperly submits the Colorado District Court's ruling to this Court in what appears to be an appeal. This Court does not have jurisdiction to consider the validity of the ruling and since the Debtor has not attempted to set-aside the ruling or to appeal the ruling in the Colorado Courts before petitioning for a Federal Review, there is no federal jurisdiction.

        7. Debtor misstates the circumstances surrounding the release of the lien filed by Debtor against the Plaintiffs in 2001. In it's ruling, the District Court noted that an Answer and Counterclaim were filed to the lien with the Fifth Counterclaim for Relief alleging the lien was “ineffective, null and void.” (see Attachment #19) because the lien had been filed over six months after the last substantial work. The Court noted that (Barbara Robbins) did not file a response to the counter-claims. As such, the lien was declared null and void.

        8. Debtor falsely claims she was denied due process because she had not received a notice of the hearing (see Response #2, Narrative line 24) and that she was not avoiding service of the summons (see Response #2, Narrative line 22).

        9. On March 1, 2004, Barbara Robbins appeared at the Courthouse in Fairplay, somehow believing that was the date of the hearing (see Attachment #20 page 4). On that date, she filed with the Court a Memorandum and a Motion (see Attachment #20 page 4). At the hearing on March 19, 2004, the Court Clerk stated to Judge Mayhew that the clerk specifically told Ms Robbins that the hearing date was March 19, 2004 (see Attachment #20 page 4). Contrary to her claims, she was aware of the date of the hearing and did not attend.

        10. On February 24, 2005, Ray Hill, a Private Process Server, personally served Barbara Robbins at her residence at 1440 Main Street, Woodland Park (see Attachment #21). Ray Hill states that:

    “Upon inquiry for Ms. Robbins, the unidentified male presumed to be George Asbury declined to entertain any such delivery of documents to Barbara Robbins. When I stated I had court papers for her, Barbara Robbins had moved from the kitchen area around the corner away from the door. The unidentified male then read the documents and stated to me that Ms. Robbins would not be coming to accept the documents at this time. Upon reading the documents further, he stated someone needed to get a life and then insisted that Barbara would not come to the door and accept service. I identified the female and stated the nature of the documents by her actions in not coming forward to accept the documents. Papers were left at the front door.” (see Attachment #21 page 1).

Mr. Hill further stated:

    “I offered to hand the Order to Barbara A. Robbins who refused service, papers were dropped”. (see Attachment #21 page 2).

Contrary to statements made by Debtor, the affidavit filed by the server plainly shows she was avoiding service.


        11. Debtor did not deny receiving the $40,000 from Viking 3 Property Owners as a disbursement, or income, in 2003, as alleged in ¶3A(1) in Memorandum (see Response#2 ¶3a). Debtor does not deny the accuracy of the numbers presented in regard to Viking 3. Nor does she deny the money received was not for taxes. Debtor flatly stated to Ms Martinez at the Meeting of Creditors that the $40,000 received from Viking 3 in 2003 went to the IRS for taxes, which is not true.

        12. Debtor refers to the monies received from her divorce as her “share of business proceeds” (see Response #2 ¶3b), however the settlement agreement signed by her on July 9, 2004, specifically refers to the money as “Spousal Maintenance” under Article Two on page 2 (see Memorandum Attachment 16G, page 2). Spousal maintenance is income. Regardless of what Debtor claims, the Court document, which she signed and had notarized, plainly states it is spousal maintenance which makes it Spousal Maintenance.

        In addition, the Separation Agreement stipulates that:

    “The Husband's obligation to pay spousal maintenance shall earlier terminate upon the Wife's death, the Wife's remarriage or the Husband's death, whichever may occur first”. (see Memorandum Attachment 16G, page 2).

        A repayment of a business debt would not cease because the other party got remarried. This is deliberate income tax evasion on the part of the Debtor, currently an enrolled agent.

        13. Debtor was able to properly remember when she sold the truck she received as part of her “Separation Agreement” but not the money? She was receiving monthly Spousal Maintenance checks for twelve months up to July, 2005, a mere three months before filing for bankruptcy and she couldn't remember them? But she claims she “incorrectly placed the settlement date in 2003” (see Response #2 ¶3b) and she is a certified tax account who keeps records? She didn't incorrectly place them, she deliberately omitted them.

        14. Debtor tries to pass off the value of the SeaRay boat as being minimal, stating she prepared the value amount in 2002, “The settlement worksheets were prepared in 2002” (see Response #2 ¶4a). Yet she submitted three different worksheets to the divorce court in 2003 (see Attachments 16b, 16c, and 16e). over a six-month period, not all of which were from 2002. To be fair and equitable, the divorce court would have allowed her to alter the value based upon the discovery the amounts were not correct, if in fact they were incorrect. The issue of the boat was raised by Ms Martinez at the Meeting of Creditors, on December 16, 2005. Plaintiffs raised the issue because it shows a tangible asset that, along with many others, seemed to have lost all of its value just before Debtor filed for bankruptcy.

        15. Debtor also passes off the cargo trailer, the camper and the 1992 Mazda as having no value. As stated above, the assets of the Debtor seemed to suddenly diminish in value or completely disappear.

        16. Debtor tries to explain away the disparity in personal property between the divorce proceeding and the bankruptcy filing as an attempt by Plaintiffs to “match up” the numbers (see Response #2¶4e). That is not so. Plaintiffs just want to see a reasonable explanation as to what happened to the assets claimed by the Debtor, which now have little or no value, and they have not been provided with an explanation or any proof.

        17. As Plaintiffs stated in the Memorandum, ¶4C:

    “As part of her duties, Robbins compiled a “Decedent's Inventory Worksheet” (see Attachment #9, pg1, #2) which listed all of the assets of the estate. The numbers on the worksheet were drawn from the face value of insurance policies, securities, real estate, and other assets. The total listed was in excess of 1.5 million dollars, some $650,000 being real estate holdings and carry-backs. Plaintiffs examined this document but were denied a copy by the Clerk of the Court in Pueblo.”

        Debtor states, “Had I received the amounts claimed by the Plaintiff's (sic) from my father's estate, there would be no need for this bankruptcy filing. These are amazingly inflated figures, based upon I don't know what” (see Response #2 ¶4f).

        Debtor does not deny she prepared the Decedent's Inventory Worksheet.

        In August of 2001, the Debtor, as personal representative, listed with the probate court the assets of the Estate of Donald Skadeland as having a value of $1,525,901.96 after liabilities:

  • A. $201,594.60 as assets in banks
  • B. $73,497.43 in pensions and life insurance
  • C. $17,133.87 in First Union Securities
  • D. $461,130.06 in stocks
  • E. $17,564.00 in Piper Jaffery
  • F. $755,000 in real estate holdings

        In 2003 and 2004, Viking 3 Properties received a minimum of $402,142.61 from the sale of property from the estate. These numbers come from the spreadsheet provided by the Debtor (see Complaint Attachment #10, pages 4-5) and county records (see Attachment #22). In addition, Viking 3 received $3,506.70 in assets from property rentals. Debtor would have the court believe there was little or no revenue from real estate because of foreclosures where Viking 3 was in a secondary position on the notes.

        On February 3, 2004, Debtor liquidated four promissory notes from the Estate of Donald Skadeland. These notes were worth $152,834.08 to the estate (see Attachment #23), not the $174,000 estimated in the real estate holdings amount. In her direct testimony at the Meeting of Creditors on December 16, 2005, Debtor flatly stated all monies received by the estate after 2003 went to taxes. The monies received on February 3, 2004 did not go to taxes. A willful and deliberate lie.

        Viking 3 Properties paid $40,000 to the IRS on July 10, 2003. (see Complaint Attachment #10, page 4). Plaintiffs can not find any further IRS payments until Debtor, as personal representative of the estate, filed protective liens on properties of the estate on May 14, 2004. The Probate Court took control of the tax payments. On February 3, 2005, a check for $115,401 was sent to the IRS from a sale of property for $145,000 on December 31, 2004 (see Attachment #24, page 1). A check for $1,500 was sent to IRS on April 15, 2005 and on June 28, 2005. All total, from what the Plaintiffs can document, the IRS received $158,401 from 2003 through 2005. Had the amount of $152,834.08, received on February 3, 2004 from the liquidation of the promissory notes, been applied to taxes as falsely claimed by Debtor, there would not be any outstanding IRA debt of $65,000.

        Therefor, from documents provided by the Debtor and on file in the Courts, the three sisters have received from the estate at least $1,133,044.92:

  • $201,594.60 in bank accounts and CDs
  • $73,497.43 in pension and life insurance
  • $461,130.06 in stocks
  • $34,697.87 in securities
  • $152,834.08 in promissory notes liquidated on February 3, 2004
  • $365,649.31 from Viking 3 real estate sales and rentals
  • minus $152.834.08 paid to the IRS, leaves
  • approximately $326,736 in cash, each. Where is the money?

        The Debtor claims the amounts are less because of such things as the “stock market crash (Plaintiffs assume she is trying to characterize the stock market after September 11 as a “crash” which it was not), real estate losses, etc. These numbers are not imaginary like her excuses. They come from papers filed under her signature and court documents. If any amounts are less then is her responsibility to prove the lesser amount because she filed the voluntary petition seeking bankruptcy protection, not the Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs have shown through documents signed by Debtor that there were substantial amounts of monies received by the Debtor from 2001 through 2005 and now she is claiming to have no assets.

        18. In Response #2, ¶4g, Debtor makes the flimsy allegation that the Plaintiffs were attempting to make the Court believe she stole monies from the estate of her father. No where do the Plaintiffs make any assertion of that nature. All the Plaintiffs did was accurately refer to the squabble going on between the sisters. It was her sister who accused her of stealing, not the Plaintiffs.

        19. Under the heading of Concealment of Assets (see Response #2 ¶5a), Debtor refers to the marital residence as being “re-financed to enable the company to pay its bills” and such was done solely in her name because she had a better credit rating than Doug Robbins, her husband at the time. During the Meeting of Creditors on December 16, 2005, Debtor responded much differently when directly questioned as to why the re-financing was in her name only. Debtor's rely to Ms Martinez was that her husband “thought it would be a good idea” at the time, an answer she does not dispute having made (see Complaint Page 12 ¶3) and that she could “only speculate” as to the reason behind that reasoning by him. Teller County assessed the property at $224,780 in May of 2001. It seems incomprehensible that the county was $176,000 off in its assessment for taxes, or 44%. While county assessments are often different than actual sales amounts, there are, as a rule, reasonably close. Debtor claims a “valid appraisal” obtained by the “lender” and then denies any affiliation with Grand West Financial, the “lender”. Yet, debtor pointedly ignores the fact that Grand West Financial was a co-defendant in the group lawsuit filed against her and NorthStar Design in Teller County and that Grand West was dropped as a defendant after Kevin Marks, owner of Grand West, cleaned out his offices, and his home, and disappeared overnight, not leaving a forwarding address.

        And, considering the foreclosure against her in 1998, under her first married name of Barbara Wells, how did she have better credit than her then husband unless she concealed the foreclosure from her lender?

        20. According to Debtors own filing with the divorce court, she left her marital residence on or about February 1, 2002 (see Complaint Attachment 16A, pg. 1, item line #6). During the Meeting of Creditors on December 16, 2005, Ms Martinez asked here when she moved out of the marital residence and she replied without hesitation, “Christmas, 2001”. The hearing she spends a lot of time ranting about occurred on February 19, 2002. She claims she left the residence “well” after the hearing. Did she lie to the divorce court and to Ms Martinez or is she lying to this Court? She was renting living space in Colorado Springs so she could file for divorce in El Paso County instead of Teller County. In addition, the court ruling to which the Debtor alludes wherein the judge allegedly chastised the Plaintiffs was unanimously overturned by the Colorado Court of Appeals in which the Court found the District Court had erred on every issue.

        21. Debtor claims she moved out of a house solely owned by her, a house she claims was worth $400,000 (according to the “valid appraisal”), a house for which she held the sole financial responsibility for payment, because it was more convenient for her spouse “because he was running the business in Florissant and it made more sense” (see Response #2 ¶5c, line 4) while she presumably commuted from her rental in Colorado Springs because there was no business without her because the contractor's license was in her name and not in the name of her husband, Douglas Robbins? And she claims the Plaintiffs should be fiction novelists (see Response #2 ¶7).

        22. Plaintiffs claimed there was no generally accepted accounting practice that justified the transactions involving the sale of a property (see Complaint ¶6) whereby:

  • A. NorthStar Companies obtained a building loan from Rocky Mountain Construction Lending for $127,901 for placing a modular home on a piece of property located at Lot 79, Indian Creek Filing No 16, Florissant, Colorado (see Complaint Attachment #2). This happened July 10, 2001.
  • B. Northstar quit-claimed that property, with house on it, to Douglas Robbins for the sum of one dollar. Signing for NorthStar was Barbara Robbins on October 12, 2001 (see Complaint Attachment #2).
  • C. Two weeks later, the private individual, Douglas Robbins, sold this property, with house on it, for $175,000 (see Complaint Attachment #2).

        Debtor makes the incredible statements that “The transaction in question (in 2001) was fairly common” (see Response #2 ¶5d line 4) and that “while not every lender required the sale to be from an individual and not a company, it did happen” (see Response #2 ¶5d lines 6-7). These statements are so factually false they leave the Plaintiffs bewildered as to the ability of the Debtor to so blandly lie concerning business practices. Of course, Debtor offers no proof supporting her statements; we are to reply solely on her word.

        The reason the Plaintiffs raise this one sale is that it was the only quit claim they could find between NorthStar and Douglas Robbins concerning this “fairly common” transaction and, again harping back to the generally accepted accounting practice theme, there is no possible business reason for the changing of title to Douglas Robbins except to conceal the transaction and the income.

        23. Under # 6 Misrepresentation of Costs, “Rent”, debtor makes the spacious statement “In reality, all rent is voluntary, but it is a requirement of staying in the house” (see Response #2 page 4). All Plaintiffs can glean from this remark is that she is admitting her so-called “rent” is “voluntary”, and, in the opinion of the Plaintiffs, rarely paid. Plaintiffs would like to point out that four times in the Complaint, Plaintiffs refer to George Asbury as her “boyfriend”, a fact she does not deny. Her rent is voluntary and therefor not contractual and she misrepresented her costs.

        24. Under “Maintenance”, Debtor doesn't believe her figure is “outrageous”, but, as the Plaintiffs asserted, it is voluntary, another fact she does not deny, and therefor, another misrepresentation about her costs.

        25. Debtor believes $23 a day for food, or the $706 a month she claimed, for one person is “very reasonable” Debtor claims a “meager way of life” (see Response ¶1 line 9); that she doesn't have “an extravagant lifestyle” (see Response ¶1 line 17). Plaintiffs still believe the figure is for the entire household which includes George Asbury and his daughter, a claim she did not deny, and therefor another misrepresentation about costs.

        26. Debtor offers nothing except her word concerning the myriad of companies she started and used. As shown herein, her word is suspect at best.

        26. Debtor claims there was “no inconsistency or lack of honesty” in Woods, et. al. Vs NorthStar Design, et. al., Teller County District Court, Case 00CV127, decided November 2, 2004, Judge Thomas L. Kennedy presiding (see Attachment #25 highlighted sections). She claims her lack of courtroom experience led to an unfavorable decision against her. She also claims the judge “specifically said there was no fraud, and no lack of fiduciary duty” (see Response #2 ¶8a). Plaintiffs never claimed there was any fraud. The Court in Wells et. al. found:

    ”The Court would begin by noting that every contract contains an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Clearly in this case (Barbara) Robbins breached that covenant as to every Plaintiff” (emphasis added)
    (see Attachment #25, page 1, ¶4)

        The Court in Wells also stated:

    “While the Court would agree in some cases unforeseen events arise during construction over which no one has control, such events should be the exception and not the norm as appears to have happened in these cases.” (emphasis added)
    (see Attachment #25, page 1, ¶4)

        The Court then stated:

    “The documents prepared by the Defendants (Barbara Robbins) are nearly incomprehensible; the numbers vary from one to the next; and draw requests can not be easily matched with the original contract. For those reasons, the Court finds that Barbara Robbins breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing with all Plaintiffs”. (emphasis added)
    (see Attachment #25, pages 1-2, ¶4)

        It certainly sounds like the Court said she failed in her fiduciary duty to her clients while she is insisting otherwise. The Court basically called her consistently dishonest.

        27. Debtor also denies any wrongdoing with Teller County wherein her license was suspended in 2001. No one claimed “that it was a law-suit” that resulted in the loss of her license. She claims “officials” feared an “outburst”, which is unsubstantiated hearsay and therefor inadmissible. No where in the minutes is there any mention of any problems or confrontations with those in attendance. She also challenges this Court to examine the minutes of the meeting (see Response #2, ¶8b). The Teller County Board Of Review November 7, 2001 Minutes are attached as Attachment #26.

    Fact: The Teller County Board of Review minutes comprise some 14 pages in which the Teller County Board of Review (“TCBR”) examines nine cases regarding contractors and three cases regarding amending the building code. The section concerning Barbara Robbins took up five pages of the fourteen total pages. No other matter took up more than part of one page.

    Fact: Page Ten of the Minutes, beginning with the last paragraph, states:

    “Mr Brandt (counsel for the TCBR) stated that the board was presented with a copy of a decree of foreclosure and notice of commencement of judicial court foreclosure filed in 1997 and it appears that the decree and notice were filed and existing prior to Mrs Robbins contractor license application in 1998. On the contractor's application the wording states, 'Has the firm or examinee ever declared bankruptcy, been involved in a lien suit against the firm or examinee, or a court suit for collection against the firm or examinee?' to which Mrs. Robbins answered 'No'.”

    Fact: A sixty-day suspension was voted down because board members did not feel it was long enough for the infractions. A ninety-day suspension was approved.

    Fact: Debtor falsely claims she had her license suspended because her (first) ex-husband “lost a piece of property to tax sale” (see Response #2 ¶8b line 2). The “property” was lost but it was because of a foreclosure on the land and the existing mortgage that remained unpaid (see Attachment #27 Page 1) in the amount of $84,307.30, against Donald Wells and Barbara Wells.

    Fact: Debtor falsely claims her (first) “ex-husband was awarded that (the land) in the settlement, and he did not pay the property taxes” (see Response #2 ¶8b lines 3-4). However, the Court approved separation agreement between Donald Wells and Barbara Wells, dated August 10, 1997, plainly states on page 5:

    “REAL PROPERTY - In consideration of all of the circumstances resulting from the total destruction of the marital residence, the Husband and wife shall retain equal and joint ownership to include any and all right, title and interest to the marital real property at 266 Sykline Drive, Woodland Park, Colorado”. (emphasis added) (see Attachment #28 page 7).

    Fact: Debtor's entire tirade about the Teller County Board of Review meeting is a material misrepresentation of fact.

        28. Under ¶10, Casualty Loss, Plaintiffs never said Debtor claimed “a loss on the sale of (her) personal home” (see Response #2 ¶10a), but as a “loss of a personal home due to fire” (see Complaint ¶11). Debtor correctly claims a fire casualty loss is “deductible in the year of loss, with the carry-forward for 20 years”, however, Ms Martinez asked her about a deduction for a “capital gains and loss” (see Complaint ¶11), not a casualty loss.

        A capital loss has a $1,500 limit filing separately and is amortized for twenty years and is based upon the loss, i.e., the amount lost after deducting the amount invested. A casualty loss is assessed for the amount lost minus any insurance.

        According to the IRS, the first-year deduction on an uninsured casualty loss is the full amount of the loss levied against taxable income with the carry-over being the difference between the loss and the taxable income, not the 10% claimed by Debtor. A fire casualty loss is not amortized over twenty years as she is doing but deducted against the taxable income every year until it no longer exists. So much for her being a licensed “expert in taxation”. (emphasis added).

        However, since the Debtor, and her first husband Donald Wells, had two mortgages with initial values of $83,000 (one of $60,000 and a second of $23,000), it is reasonable to assume the lending company required insurance, or proof of insurance, before granting the mortgage(s). Therefor, either the Debtor and her husband allowed the insurance to lapse, which the Plaintiffs doubt is an accurate scenario, or the insurance company refused to pay after the fire for one reason or another. In any event, under IRS rules, a foreclosure is a sale of property, and since it was a primary marital residence, and a party can not claim a loss on the sale of a primary residence, which Barbara Robbins has openly stated she is doing.

        Had the fire casualty loss been legitimate, the insurance company would have paid, or, if no insurance, the loss would be deductible in the years immediately following the loss, not amortized for twenty years as a capital gain/loss. Plaintiffs believe however there are circumstance surrounding the loss that would require explanation. In the Separation Agreement, under Debts And Obligations, page 5, is:

    “4. Any and all contingent liability arising from the fire and destruction of the marital residence to include any and all claims or causes of action brought by AllState Insurance Company pertaining to the payoff of the first and second mortgages or in any other matter whatsoever". (see Attachment #28 page 5).

        Certainly sounds like Debtor was aware the insurance company was looking at the fire as suspicious and wanted to be distanced from future problems. Yet, in the same agreement, she insisted she retain partial ownership in the remaining real estate.

        Debtor claims Plainvtiffs are “totally incorrect” (see Response #2 ¶10 Line 7) and as convoluted as the situation is, could the Debtor please show physical proof as to where the Plaintiffs are incorrect? Her word certainly is not sufficient.

        29. Debtor repeatedly states “Plaintiffs are again completely wrong in their claims” (see Response #2 ¶11a Line 1). Again, she puts her foot in her mouth when she claims real estate agents are self-employed as defined by the IRS.

        The IRS defines one aspect of self-employed as being an “independent contractor” . According to the IRS, a person is an independent contractor if “the person for whom you perform services for has only the right to control or direct the result of your work, not what will be done, or how it will be done”. (see Attachment #29).

        A real estate broker tells the agent what to sell, for how much, puts the agent on the business cards and web site, provides and office and telephone, provides sale signs, dictates commissions, requires agent attend meetings and open houses, etc. By the IRS definition that is telling the person how and where to do their job.

        30. Debtor refers to some promissory notes “that we sold long ago” (see Response #2 ¶13 line 7) and that these notes were from houses her father had sold and carried the notes (see Response #2 ¶13 lines 6-7). Debtor alludes to 2001 as the date wherein these notes were liquidated. However, in 2003, Debtor's sister Cathy Clamp, filed a Motion For Interim Accounting (see Complaint Attachment #8) on March 24, 2003, in which she specifically refers to these “promissory notes” as having “not been distributed, nor has the status of these assests been communicated to the heirs” (see Complaint Attachment #8 page 2, ¶2 and ¶6c). However, these properties were not sold in 2001 as alleged by the Debtor but on February 3, 2004 (see Attachment #23). These notes were worth $152,834.08 to the estate (see Attachment #23), not the $174,000 estimated in the real estate holdings amount that was quoted by Cathy Clamp. In her direct testimony at the Meeting of Creditors on December 16, 2005, Debtor flatly stated all monies received by the estate after 2003 went to taxes. The monies received on February 3, 2004 did not go to taxes. Another willful and deliberate lie. These monies were either distributed to the three sisters in 2004 or kept by the Debtor.

        Second mortgages, such as those held by Viking 3, are not promissory notes, but are unsecured real estate assets in which Viking 3 has a second position. The claim made by the Debtor that a breakdown of their current condition was provided to Ms Martinez was directly disputed by the Trustee's office on March 10, 2006, when the Trustee's Office informed Plaintiffs that the Debtor had provided an incomprehensible worksheet about jewelry and personal property (see Attachments #31) and nothing concerning any other topic from the Meeting of Creditors.

        31. Debtor claims there “has been no false oath or account” (see Response #2 ¶14) yet Plaintiffs have, time and time again, pointed out her false statements using documents containing her signature and/or documents filed with county and state courts while the only proof offered by the Debtor is her word. She did not submit any documents to support her claims of innocence pertaining to the voluntary petition and the allegations in the Complaint. The documents presented by the Plaintiffs are real and substantial while the Debtor waves her hand and sniffs, “Plaintiffs don't like me” (see Response #1 line 3). The fact monies were outside the time frame requested in the voluntary petition is pertinent because those monies reveal assets that have disappeared in anticipation of the voluntary petition.

        32. Debtor's claim that “all funds have been accounted for to the Bankruptcy trustee” (see Response #2 ¶16) is false as the trustee's office, as of March 10, 2006, found her spreadsheet incomprehensible and that she has yet to supply the other information requested. Debtor claims the amounts claimed are wrong and don't allow for other expenses such as business costs, medical bills, etc, while not providing this Court with a single shred of evidence supporting her claims. If she could prove her claims she would have readily supplied documentation.

        33. Debtor also claims large sums of money were spent “for starting a new business, costs for advertising and broker fees” (see Response #2 ¶16 line 8), yet she maintains a non-intrusive office in her residence, which under Teller County zoning, can not have a sign or walk-in clients. What kind of real estate business can be successful with an office no prospective client can use? Advertising is the life blood of real estate companies. Her advertising is minimal, and she readily admitted to Ms Martinez during the Meeting of Creditors that she presently had only one listing and described it as a “shack” on Bennett Avenue in Cripple Creek. One listing? No office sign? No walk-in client business? Little or no advertising? Her business and the expenses are a sham.

        34. Debtor's claim of Plaintiffs' actions being obsessive (see Response #2 ¶17 lines 1-2) are not new, and as before, is unsubstantiated hearsay which is inadmissible. On May 5, 2001, Barbara Robbins sent a letter to the Teller County Building Department (see Attachment #30) in which she characterizes Plaintiff Meadors as having “an obsessive/compulsive personality, is irrationally obsessed with hatred”, “behaving in a psychotic manner”, “a very dangerous man”, and more (see Attachment #30, page 1 ¶3 lines 4-7). She also claimed that Plaintiff Meadors was stalking her and that the “local sheriff deputies checks on (her) at night to make sure everything is OK” (see Attachment #30, page 2 ¶3 lines 1-3). On June 21, 2001, Plaintiff Meadors wrote a letter to the Teller County Sheriff's Department (see Attachment #30, page 3) wherein he requested the Sheriffs Department please look into the situation so he could respond to any complaint she may have filed against him (see Attachment #30 ¶5). The Sheriffs Department received the letter on June 25 and replied (see Attachment #30, page 4) that their records show “no record of any contacts with this agency” and that there were “no new cases or charges pending”. Barbara Robbins never believed that anyone would take the time to verify her lies. Her statements in paragraph 17 are calculated to defame the Plaintiffs in the eyes of this Court, and as such, she should be strongly cautioned about making defamatory statements.

        35. Debtor submitted documents to the Bankruptcy Trustee concerning information requested at the Meeting of Creditors. Plaintiffs requested copies of this information and were provided copies except for tax returns. Plaintiffs received six pages of documents on March 13, 2006 (see Attachment #31, page 1).

        36. The documents submitted to Ms Martinez by Debtor on or about December 29, 2005, refute statements made by the Debtor.

        37. Debtor admitted to her lawyer that her estimate of personal property to the Divorce Court was “a substantial over statement” (see Attachment #31, page 2, ¶3), concerning the clothing, she also admitted that “I picked $25,000.00, which I knew was really high, but I also knew that he would not dispute it” (see Attachment #31, page 6, Notes re: clothes), concerning jewelry, she also admitted “I included an intentionally inflated figure to avoid having my ex contest the document” (see Attachment #31, page 6, Notes re: jewelry), and on and on, she claims she had a rational reason for lying to the divorce court. One fact she omitted was that she never expected her husband to contest the numbers submitted to the Divorce Court because she never served him with the papers as required. Douglas Robbins submitted affidavits to the Divorce Court in support of his challenge to the default judgment showing he had never been served. The Court agreed with him and vacated the default judgment.

        38. Debtor claims her figure of a value of $75.00 for a Ruger handgun “is accurate” (see Attachment #31, page 5, item 3), yet she offers no explanation as to how this item decreased so much in value in such a short period of time and she offers NO proof she actually gave the item away. However, she does use the handgun as an excuse to again attempt to enter irrelevant and unsubstantiated hearsay testimony concerning the Plaintiffs that is defamatory (see Attachment #31, page 6, Notes re: guns), where she makes a vague reference to obtaining a concealed carry permit attempting to link it with the Plaintiffs and then claims “Teller County law enforcement INSISTED that I get the permit, and carry it (the handgun) at all times”. A simple telephone call to the Teller County Sheriff's Department easily confirmed that it was not their policy to insist anyone get a permit or to insist anyone carry a handgun. Teller County cited privacy issues while declining to confirm the actual existence of the concealed carry permit. Plaintiffs don't believe one exists and therefor another lie.

        39. Debtor lists a number of articles and their estimated value to the Bankruptcy Trustee. Among the items listed are Bev Doolittle book prints with initial values of $350.00 (see Attachment #31, page 6, ARTWORK). These appear to be limited edition lithographs that should appreciate in value, not decrease. However, since the Debtor did not disclose any usable information about the art work, such as date bought, identity or description of work, signed/unsigned, numbered, etc, no one could make a reasonable guess at to whether or not the value assigned by the Debtor has any significance. One could reasonably assume the value assigned to the art work by the Debtor will be as low as possible as to avoid the art work being used to pay off claims. It therefor becomes the responsibility of the Debtor to prove the low value assigned to any and all assets, especially considering the “voluntary petition” for bankruptcy. Debtor states “the FMV is based upon what I could get for the prints at a garage sale - on a really good day”. What idiot really tries to sell, or value, art work at a yard sale? Debtor's FMV has no basis without detailed and accurate descriptions of the items involved.

        40. The statements about jewelry are designed to minimize the value of the pieces. Again, we only have the Debtor's “word” concerning the value, or lack of value, of the jewelry. 41. Under Disposition of the proceeds from the sale of the 1999 F-350 $14,370.00, (see Attachment #31, page 7), Debtor claims expenses for June 1, 2005 through August 30, 2005 (ninety days) that include:

  • A. Groceries - $2,004.26. What? That's too much for food. Earth to Barbara - you can eat for less.
  • B. Travel & Entertainment - $731.05. Again, what? She's claiming she's broke. Maybe she should begin acting like it?
  • C. Auto Expenses - $816.30. She drives a Lexus. This figure isn't her car payment so maybe she needs a cheaper car?
  • D. Insurance (under Business) - $853.59. Whoa. For what? Her office is in her boyfriends home where she is living and there are no clients going there.

        She makes claims of expenses and expects everyone to absolutely believe them.

        They need to be justified. After all, she is the one petitioning to be relieved of her legal obligation to pay others what she owes them, therefor she needs to justify and prove the amounts that she is spending that can not be used to pay her legitimate debts.


        42. Debtor did not serve a copy of her Response to the Plaintiffs in a timely manner a required by the FRCP and Bankruptcy Rules. A copy of her Response was mailed to the Plaintiffs on March 10, 2006, a full eight days after the document was filed with the Court in Denver. Plaintiffs received the response on March 13, 2006. This is not consistent with the requirement that the other party be served with a copy of all filings concurrently with the Court. Plaintiffs would like the court to note there was NO certificate of service as part of the response filed by the Debtor.

        43. Debtor has demonstrated a pattern of failing to serve the other party, or failing to serve in a timely manner, in previous matters before other courts. In her divorce filing (see ¶37 above), she did not serve her husband and obtained a default divorce, later set aside. In the Probate Court in Pueblo, there is a letter to the Court objecting to her late service of documents, similar to ¶42 above. Plaintiffs request this Court order the Debtor to comply with the rules of service and sanction her if she does not.


Therefore, Plaintiffs Karen Dudnikov and Michael Meadors respectfully request that this Court enter a judgment determining that Defendant is not entitled to a discharge in bankruptcy for her debts under 11 U.S.C. §727(a), or alternately, to dismiss under 11 U.S.C. § 707(b), together with an order for costs and expenses.

        Respectfully submitted this 16th day of March, 2006.

Karen Dudnikov

Michael Meadors

Karen Dudnikov Michael Meadors
3463 Maskoke Trail P.O. Box 87
Hartsel, CO 80449

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